ABSTRACT Do U.S. publicly-traded companies led by entrepreneurs perform better than nonentrepreneur-led U.S. public companies? Our data suggests they do. We analyze monthly stock returns of U.S. publicly traded companies over the time period 1998-2010 and find compelling evidence demonstrating that irrespective of market capitalization and time period, companies led by U.S. entrepreneurs provide better stock performance than several stock market indices primarily comprised of non-entrepreneur-led U.S. companies.
INTRODUCTION
Do U.S. publicly-traded companies led by entrepreneurs perform better than non-entrepreneurled U.S. public companies? Our data suggests they do. We analyze U.S. publicly traded companies and find compelling evidence demonstrating that irrespective of market capitalization and time period, companies led by U.S. entrepreneurs provide better stock performance than several stock market indices comprised primarily of non-entrepreneur-led U.S. companies.
These results are statistically significant with vast differences between our two data sets.
LITERATURE SUPPORT FOR ENTREPRENEUR PERFORMANCE
A growing body of finance literature examines the performance of firms and the underlying equity with respect to family ownership and management. Much of the support hinges on founder control and ownership versus non-family and descendent control. Agency theory suggests that owner-controlled companies outperform agent-operated corporations as the interests of management and shareholders are better aligned. On the other hand, Fama (1980) , in his managerial labor market hypothesis posits that good managerial talent can be hired away by other organizations. Value accrues to shareholders only after netting out the pay premium afforded professional managers (e.g. value to organization associated with work less total compensation for agents). Moreover, founders and families may gain both perquisites and nonpecuniary rewards from ownership and control to the detriment of stockholder returns.
This paper examines the equity return performance of publicly traded U.S.
entrepreneurial companies and compares against the return performance of a number of benchmark indices from January 1998 through April 30, 2010 time period. This time frame encompasses both boom and recession stages in the business cycle as well as bull and bear periods in the stock market. The U.S. capital markets enjoyed a high growth phase prior to the turn of the millennium and subsequently were severely impacted by a downturn in both the economy and capital markets in the most recent October, 2007 through February, 2009 Given the upturn in the capital markets in the latter part of 2009, we find particular interest in the movements during both extremely weak and strong markets.
Literature Review
A number of studies including Shulman and Cox (2010) , Barontini and Caprio (2006) , and Villalonga and Amit (2005) , support the notion that firm value is higher with a founder chief executive officer (CEO) rather than under second generation CEOs. Alternatively, Livingston (2007) , McConaughy et al (1998 ), Fahhenbrach (2003 ), and Palia and Ravid (2002 find that firm value is higher when run by a descendent rather than a founder. In many cases, studies indicate that nepotism hurts performance, as discussed in Gonzalez (2006) and Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) .
Research shows that founder-CEO operated firms provide superior stock returns compared to non-founder CEO firms, McVey and Drako (2005) , Cox and Shulman (2008) , Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Hermalin and Weisback (1980) . This is in contrast to earlier research, Daily and Dalton (1992) , Willard (1992) , Jayaraman, Khoranan and Weiling (2000) , Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , providing conflicting evidence suggesting that there are no differences in stock returns between the two sets.
There are two competing views on how concentrated family ownership might affect the efficiency of a company: the entrenchment effect and alignment effect. The entrenchment effect address the agency conflicts between managers and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and posits that concentrated ownership creates incentives for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from other shareholders ((Fama and Jensen 1983) and (Shleifer and Vishny 1988)). The alignment effect, Wang (2006) , insinuates that focalized family ownership enables family members to maintain a long-term presence in the entity and have the enticement to preserve the family name and reputation to create lasting employee loyalty. Krug (2003) describes how executive departures disrupt continuity, internal decision making, stakeholder relationships and strategic projects. Further, Cannella and Hambrick (1993) and Krishnan et al (1997) chronicle how rates of top management departures are associated with lower firm performance. Chen and Lee (2008) analyze the financial performance of family-owned ventures and find that the return on assets is higher relative to non-family owned firms. They also discovered that employee remuneration is negatively related to family ownership.
Founder-controlled firms possess the original owner and manager of the organization.
This founder has been endowed with vision and managerial acumen in so far as they have raised the firm from a startup, taken it public, listed the stock on an exchange, and grown it to be a large capitalization, publicly traded corporation. Shulman (2009) Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) , Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Gonzalez (2006) and provides evidence that there may be a number of other factors, besides founder control, that distinguish entrepreneurial companies from non-entrepreneurial companies.
In this paper, Shulman (2009) 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We hypothesize that our publicly traded U.S. entrepreneur companies' entrepreneurs generate superior returns for investors, relative to our comparative benchmark indices, as well as risk- 
Sources of Information
We gather our data from a variety of sources including: 1) Compustat for financial data; 2)
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for monthly stock price data; 3) Capital IQ for stock price data unavailable on CRSP; 4) ExecuComp for management compensation data; 5)
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) monthly and quarterly corporate filings for ownership data, company acquisitions, financial reports and other noteworthy disclosures; 6)
Company reports and management conference calls (accessed through archive records on Yahoo Finance); 7) S&P Net Advantage for ancillary debt information; 8) Thompson One Financial for merger-acquisition deal data; 9) Internet searches for miscellaneous company data.
Figure 1 Entrepreneur Company Filter
We begin our search process by gathering qualitative and quantitative data on our 15 entrepreneurial attributes from the data sources identified above. Our combined databases provide information on over 33,000 global companies. We narrow our list of 33,000+ companies down to 9,000+ after removing those companies with incomplete financial statement, stock price or informational disclosures. We then apply some of our 15 attribute criteria to arrive at approximately 2,400+ companies deemed to be in our broad entrepreneur classification (shown in Figure 1 ). The first run of broad entrepreneur attribute filters can be handled very quickly and efficiently through quantitative screening. In particular, some (but not all) questions regarding team and especially financial resources can be handled in this manner and we are able to further reduce our broad entrepreneurs to a grouping of approximately 800+ publicly traded entrepreneurial companies. We then refine our set of broad entrepreneurs based on a company- In entrepreneur-controlled firms, the alignment theory is believed to be governing the conduct of the controlling entrepreneur (CEO) who has incentive to run a tight ship and cause the firm to excel. Entrepreneur firms have a higher ownership stake of the top five stockholders compared to non-entrepreneur or peer benchmark entities. Further, entrepreneur companies have a higher return on invested capital (ROIC) compared to the average ROIC for the benchmark index companies. Entrepreneur companies also have a sustainable growth rate (i.e. the retention rate multiplied by the return on equity) better than that of the benchmark index sustainable growth rate. And, in our study, entrepreneur companies have lower financial leverage, measured by the debt-to-assets ratio, than that of the benchmark companies. All selected entrepreneur corporations have lower executive turnover (i.e. Chairman of the Board (COB), CEO and Chief Financial Officer (CFO)) compared to the average of the benchmark indices with the average duration of service of the top three executives being longer than that of benchmark companies.
Finally, the dividend payout ratio for entrepreneur companies is less than the average index firm's dividend payout ratio.
Annual stock returns are calculated for the U.S. entrepreneur portfolio on an equally weighted average basis.
That is,
where R it is the annual return for stock i in time t, P t is the stock price at time t, D t is the dividend paid during time t,
In addition, the average return, pt , and the standard deviation, σ p , for each portfolio is calculated across the 15 year time period (t) such that
where n is the number of stocks in the portfolio.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The graph in Figure 1 shows the Value Added Monthly Index (VAMI) for the U.S. entrepreneurs and comparative index benchmarks. The VAMI shows the growth of a hypothetical $1000 investment and is computed as:
Current VAMI = Previous VAMI x (1+ current rate of return)
As we see in Figure 2 , over the entire time period of the study, all three of the entrepreneur index benchmarks dominate the stock index benchmarks by a wide margin. Russell 3000 and S&P 500) have very low or negative Sharpe ratios ranging from 0.07 to -0.12.
Another risk metric shown in Table 3 , the Sortino ratio, provides a measure of excess return relative to "bad" volatility.
The Sortino ratio is determined as: Table 5 shows the percent profitable periods with all of the groups ranging from 60 to 70% during the entire 12 year period. Figure 3 shows the distribution of monthly returns over this same time period. 
where α p is the alpha of the portfolio p is the total portfolio return R f is the risk free rate By contrast, the other benchmark indices have a negative active premium of -0.13 to -2.53%.
The information ratio (IR) measures the portfolio manager's ability to earn excess returns (active premium) relative to a specified benchmark, with a view toward consistency favoring a high IR.
The Information Ratio is determined as:
where, I r is the Information Ratio R p is the return of the portfolio R i is the return of the index or benchmark S p-i is the tracking error (standard deviation of the difference between returns of the portfolio and the returns of the index)
The tracking error will be high (and positive) if the portfolio manager has a few very strong months (relative to the index) and relatively low if the portfolio has consistently beaten the index in many months. Consequently, a relatively large numerator (excess premium) and relatively low denominator (low tracking error) will provide a relatively high information ratio.
The information ratios for the entrepreneurs range from a relatively strong 1.19 to 1.46 with corresponding tracking errors ranging from 23.26 to 15.36%. By contrast, the information ratios for the comparative indices range from -0.01 to -0.57 with tracking errors running from 12.58 to 4.46%. Although the entrepreneurs have considerably higher tracking errors than the benchmarks, the relatively high active premiums more than compensate for the higher volatility, thus yielding very large information ratios. Table 6 also provides data describing the Down Capture Ratio and the Up Capture Ratio.
These two columns correspond with the relative rise or fall the portfolios experience with comparative index movements.
The definition follows:
Up/Down Market Capture Ratio = (Manager's Returns / Index Returns) x 100
An Up/Down Market Capture Ratio of 100 implies that the manager moves at the same rate as the market index. For example, an Up Capture Ratio of 200 implies that the investment manager outperforms the index by 100%, or double the index, during the up-market in the specified period. Again this shows the superior risk-adjusted performance of the entrepreneurs.
As Table 7 shows, the Small Cap entrepreneur group has the lowest overall correlation with other portfolio offerings, ranging from 0.72 to 0.82, the lowest correlation being between the S&P 500 indexes representing large capitalization stocks. The correlation matrix demonstrates that investors can gain not only additional return premium from the Small Cap entrepreneurs, but also some diversification benefit as well.
CONCLUSIONS
The equity performance of entrepreneurial publicly traded U.S. companies significantly outperforms peer benchmarks during the 1998-2010 period of our study. The entrepreneurial companies clearly dominate on all risk and return metrics, including annualized rate of return, Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio, alpha, active premium, information ratio and Up Capture ratio. In some cases the differences between entrepreneurial companies and benchmarks are extraordinarily wide. Clearly, we do not know if the results of our time period can be extrapolated to future time periods.
Given the strong performance of the entrepreneurial portfolios we believe that investors would likely benefit from monitoring the behavior of company executives consistent with the entrepreneur approach. This includes compensation policies, R&D investments, and hiring/firing practices as well as personal investment/ownership patterns among key managers at the firm. These results lend support to the alignment hypothesis in conjunction with the agency theory. If the past portends the future, investors could create a trading rule of simply buying (long) entrepreneur-controlled U.S. company firms that also exhibit managerial performance characterized by the operating variable described in the paper.
Possibilities for future research include the persistence of this phenomenon in the U.S.
capital market and perhaps the entrepreneurial anomaly in the other country markets as on industry effect. Moreover, the set of operating factors may change over time and would need to be explored to retain their relevancy. 
